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Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The Mod-
ern Interpretation-By William F. Swindlert
Reviewed By Richard E. Shugrue*
The perennial debate among legal scholars over the most in-
teresting, intriguing and dynamic field of law continues well into
the 1970s. Striking new developments in environmental law,'
domestic relations, 2 the electoral process,3 civil rights4 and so on,
may briefly dazzle students, attorneys and jurists, but if there is
an underlying thread of law which consistently holds the attention
of the entire profession and which leads increasing numbers of per-
sons to espouse their own expertise, it is American constitutional
law.5
Executive impoundment of appropriated funds,6 the impeach-
t New York, N.Y.: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1974. $12.95.
* Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. A.B., 1959;
J.D., 1962; Ph.D., 1968, University of Nebraska.
1. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114
(1974).
2. Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
3. Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 94
S. Ct. 1315 (1974); American Party of Texas v. White, 94 S. Ct. 1296
(1974); Storer v. Brown, 94 S. Ct. 1274 (1974).
4. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 94 S. Ct. 2718 (1974); Morton v.
Mancari, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 94
S. Ct. 2416 (1974); Bradley v. School Bd., 94 S. Ct. 2006 (1974); De
Funis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974); Mayor v. Educational Equal-
ity League, 94 S. Ct. 1323 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974).
5. Three examples of the varied opinion one encounters in the area of
constitutional law are: Symposium: Pivotal Decisions of the Su-
preme Court, 15 AmIz. L. REv. 224 (1973); Men, Women, and the
Constitution: The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 COLUM. J. LAW &
SOCIAL PROB. 77 (1973); Student Symposium: Recent Developments in
Individual Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1036.
6. State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972),
modified in part, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); Stanton, History and
Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB.
L. REv. 1 (1974); Note, The Impoundment Question-An Overview,
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ment issue,7 the politics of the judiciary8 and an acute awareness
on the part of the bar that its every public action is being criti-
cally observed 9 surely contribute to a mounting interest in con-
stitutional law. For in that grand discipline arise more complex
questions than in any other, more nooks and crannies in which
legal mystery lies, more of the heartbeat of American history and
politics, and a singular rhetoric not found in what might mistak-
enly be called settled disciplines which histrionics are played on
a multitude of widely observed stages from Washington to Lincoln.
C. Herman Pritchett has observed that the
Constitution has great value as a symbol of unity for a nation
of vast expanse and diverse interests. But as an instrument of
government, its language has had to be given life and meaning
by the events that have occurred since 1789. Congress animates
the Constitution every time it passes a law or holds a hearing.
The President construes the Constitution whenever he makes a de-
cision, issues an executive order, or signs a bill into law.' 0
Pritchett suggested that the Constitution "is discoverable equally
at lower levels, in the routines and customs of public life, in what
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called the inarticulate premises of
a nation and a people.""
For the lawyer, the very center of constitutional government
is found in the vast body of case law crafted not only by the Su-
preme Court of the United States but also by every judicial body
including municipal courts12 which are called upon to rule on the
myriad constitutional questions raised daily in their precincts.
40 BRooimyx L. REV. 342 (1973); Note, The President and Congress:
Impoundment of Domestic Funds, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SocAL CHANGE
93 (1973); Note, 27 RUTGERs L. REV. 201 (1973).
7. Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming?, 60 A.B.A.J.
681 (1974); Van Alstyne, President Nixon: Toughing It Out with the
Law, 59 A.B.A.J. 1398 (1973); Cox, Some Reflections on Possible
Abuses of Governmental Power, RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. (1973); Note,
Executive Impeachment: Stealing Fire From the Gods, 9 NEw ENG.
L. REv. 257 (1974).
8. Martin, Courts and Reapportionment: The Exemption of Judicial
Elections, 62 Ky. L.J. 43 (1973-1974); Garwood, Judicial Revision-
An Argument for the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure,
5 TExAs TEcH L. REv. 1 (1973); Comment, One Man-One Vote and
Judicial Selection, 50 NEB. L. REV. 642 (1971).
9. Allen, New Horizons in Professional Responsibility, 52 NEB. L. Rv.
24 (1972); Marshall, Professional Responsibility and Constitutional
Doctrine, 48 Tum. L. REv. 465 (1974); Symposium: Professional Re-
sponsibility, 51 NEB. L. REV. 367 (1972).
10. C. PRITCHETT, THE A_ FcN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 1, (3d ed. 1971).
11. Id. at 2.
12. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. PoL.
Sci. REV. 1017 (1959); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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The very dynamics of the Constitution result in a knowledge
lag on the part of many attorneys who, though exposed to the
principles of law in their first year of legal education, have since
found it impossible or at least impractical to wade into the vast
body of law pouring from state and federal courts each term.
Highly specialized-and popular-books, such as Berger's volume
on impeachment, 13 naturally concentrate on one minute slice of
constitutional doctrine, so that the broad overview is not generally
written nor, if written, does it receive the attention it deserves.14
There have been exceptions to this rule. Corwin's The Con-
stitution and What It Means Today' 5 has gone through more than
a dozen editions and has been a desk-top bible of constitutional
law for attorneys and laymen alike. A popularized version, read
by literally scores of thousands of students of government and his-
tory, is Corwin and Peltason's Understanding the Constitution.6
Since the death of Professor Corwin in 1963, there has been a
genuine need for a concise and modern interpretation of the Con-
stitution with sufficient if not torrential documentation.
Nebraskans might, in light of all this, take a certain pride in
the recently published Court and Constitution in the Twentieth
Century: The Modern Interpretation17 (hereinafter The Modern
Interpretation) by Professor William F. Swindler of the Marshall
Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary.
Professor Swindler was at the University of Nebraska from
1946 to 1956 as professor and director of the School of Journalism.
He took his legal training at Nebraska, receiving his degree in
1958 before going to William and Mary that fall. He is now one of
the most prolific scholars in the area of constitutional law,1 8 hav-
13. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
14. Two helpful volumes not intended to be monumental documents on
the Constitution are R. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
(1960) and B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1967).
15. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT rr MEANS TODAY (12th ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN].
16. E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed.
1964).
17. W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
THE MODERN INTERPRETATION (1974) [hereinafter cited as SWINDLER].
18. Without reproducing an exhaustive bibliography of Professor Swind-
ler's work, it is sufficient to illustrate the breadth of his scholarship
by citing Swindler, The Supreme Court, The President, and Congress,
19 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 671 (1970); Swindler, Fifty-One Chief Justices,
60 KY. L.J. 851 (1971-1972); Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th
Century, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577 (1971); Swindler, The Chief Justice and
Law Reform, 1921-1971, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 241.
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ing contributed in a most significant sense to the understanding
of the vital processes of American government and law.
While The Modern Interpretation can certainly be read as a
vade mecum of modern constitutional law, it would be a disservice
to Swindler's brilliant scholarship not to acknowledge that it is but
a small part of a powerful trilogy beginning with the Old Legality
1889-193219 published in 1969 and The New Legality 1932-196820
which came off the press the following year. It is safe to say that
Swindler's contribution to understanding the American Constitu-
tion is hardly limited to these three volumes. One can scarcely
pick up a journal devoted to the monumental issues of constitu-
tional law without seeing an article by him. The very latest in
the avalanche of legal periodicals, the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly, contains his provocative commentary "The Executive
Power in State and Federal Constitutions."21 He was invited to
write in that journal along with retired Justices Tom C. Clark and
Arthur J. Goldberg and Charles L. Black, Jr., Luce Professor of
Jurisprudence at Yale.
Because of the pervasive influence of Corwin's The Constitu-
tion and What it Means Today, it is inevitable that Swindler's
The Modern Interpretation will be compared with Corwin's stand-
ard work. Corwin's book, the longer of the two, begins with the
preamble and annotates the Constitution directly and throughout
the text. It is a very formal exposition, relying significantly on
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States through-
out the history of American judicial review. Corwin himself re-
minds the reader that just as the Constitution is a living document,
susceptible to constant reinterpretation, therefore, each progress-
sive edition must contain the more recent decisions of the high
court.
2 2
Swindler's plan for his book is better. He indicates in his pref-
atory remarks that there are "two separate commentaries on the
Constitution in the pages which follow."3 Let him describe the
plan:
The first, occupying pages 4-55, is a literal reprint of the original
text, divided into historical periods and with accompanying back-
19. W. SWnDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TwE CENTURY
THE OLD LEGA=ITY 1889-1932 (1969).
20. W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CoNSTIrrUTIoN IN THE TWENTirm CENTURY
THE NEW LEGALTY 1932-1968 (1970).
21. Swindler, The Executive Power in State and Federal Constitutions,
1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21 (1974).
22. CoRwiN, supra note 14, at v-viii.
23. SwnLER, supra note 17, at xv.
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ground notes which illustrate the changing character of the docu-
ment over parts of three centuries ....
The second commentary or interpretation, occupying the major
part of the book, is a clause-by-clause analysis of the Constitution
in terms of the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
Where, as in certain instances, the judicial understanding of a
clause remains unchanged from its nineteenth-century interpreta-
tion, this is made clear. The main emphasis of this portion of
the book, however, is on recent decisions-i.e., post-1937-which
have expressed the contemporary Court's view of the passage in
the text.
24
This scheme, which Swindler employs successfully, permits the
reader to browse in the book to refresh his rusty historical memory
or alternatively to use it as a ready reference to acquaint himself
with a constitutional doctrine. Naturally, the exposition is far
from exhaustive. A lawyer briefing an "Establishment of Reli-
gion" case, involving the permissibility of an allegedly innocuous
prayer recited before a kindergarten snack, would find that Swind-
ler's book does not tell much. The total allusion to Engel v. Vi-
tale,25 the now-famous 1962 school-prayer decision, is: "And in
1962 the Court held unconstitutional under the "establishment"
clause a non-denominational prayer approved by the New York
state regents.1
26
Similarly, if one is seeking to determine the fine distinctions
in the rules applicable to the giving of the so-called Miranda 27
warning to a criminally-accused, he would find that Swindler
says:
[I]n Miranda v. Arizona, the Court summarized the various cases
on self-incrimination in a declaration that "the Fifth Amendment
privilege ... serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled to in-
criminate themselves." . . . . In 1971, in a case widely discussed
as a limitation on the Miranda principle, Chief Justice Burger for
the Court held that even if a statement could not be admitted
as evidence as part of the prosecution's case in chief, because of
its having been obtained without complying with Miranda stand-
ards, it could be introduced to impeach defendant's credibility.28
24. Id.
25. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
26. SwnmLER, supra note 17, at 173. This is troublesome in light of
the most recent court decision considering religious exercises in
public schools, such as Grossberg v. Deusebio, 42 U.S.L.W. 2653 (E.
Va. June 7, 1974), in which Judge Merhige ruled that the inclusion
of an invocation and benediction in a public high school graduation
ceremony violates neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise
clause in light of the purpose and effect test enunciated in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. SWnDLR, supra note 17, at 200.
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While Miranda v. Arizona raised a substantial amount of debate
over the broad linkage of the Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amend-
ment guarantees . , with resulting efforts at limitation by both
Congress and Court, the continuing tenor of judicial application
of the specific clause in this Amendment suggests that it has be-
come accepted as a fundamental and persuasive right.
29
In the area of obscenity, Swindler's exposition is more thor-
ough,3 0 though no less dated by virtue of the June, 1974 decisions,
and especially the decision reviewing the Georgia determination
that the film Carnal Knowledge is obscene.31 The return to the
contemporary community standard of Roth v. United States,
3 2
which Swindler says was accomplished in Miller v. California&3
and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,34 resulted not in the appli-
cation of community norms, but rather in the potential transforma-
tion of the Supreme Court's conference room into a screening
theatre for allegedly obscene movies.35
Finally, in the area of impeachment, Swindler sets forth only
the barest outline of the monumental debate (which continues
through 1974) over the questions of what is an impeachable of-
fense and what are the boundaries of so-called executive privi-
lege,36 thereby tantalizing the reader, perhaps, into far more thor-
ough investigation.
Each of these examples illustrates two observations about the
Swindler book. The first is that Swindler, like Corwin before
him, had no intention of painting a picture of the Constitution with
a detailed line. Swindler's own scholarship is testimony enough
to the kind of depth investigation of various subject matter which
would satisfy the thirst for knowledge of the brief writer or serious
student of the law. The Modern Interpretation is crafted in broad
29. Id. at 211-12.
30. Id. at 178-80.
31. Hamling v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia,
42 U.S.L.W. 5055 (U.S. June 24, 1974).
32. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
33. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
34. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
35. Mr. Justice Brennan observed in his Jenkins dissent:
After the Court's decision today, there can be no doubt
that Miller requires appellate courts-including this Court-
to review independently the constitutional fact of obscenity
.... In order to make the review mandated by Miller, the
Court was required to screen the film Carnal Knowledge and
make an independent determination of obscenity vel non.
42 U.S.L.W. 5055, 5058 (U.S. June 24, 1974).
36. SwnDLE_, supra note 17, at 80-82.
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brush strokes and is not intended to be a thorough investigation
of every constitutional principle.
The second is the frustration which every author-and espe-
cially those who comment on the American constitutional process
-faces: the obsolescence of the material, or at least some of it.
Perhaps obsolescence is the wrong word; "dated" might be better.
It could be particularly embarrassing to a writer who claims that
his work is a thorough updating of constitutional doctrine. The
latest decision of the Supreme Court considering the Miranda warn-
ings is a case in point. The Court in Michigan v. Tucker,37 through
Justice Rehnquist, pointed out that the defendant had not been
advised of his right to appointed counsel, but indicated that it was
the posture of the justices that this advice and the rest of the
Miranda package were merely "protective guidelines" and "these
procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."
3 8
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, took vigorous exception to
this position:
I cannot agree when the Court says that the interrogation here
"did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, but departed only from 'the prophylactic standards
later laid down by this Court in Miranda .... We held the "re-
quirement of warnings and waiver of rights [to be] fundamental
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege," 384 U.S., at 476,
and without so holding we would have been powerless to reverse
Miranda's conviction.3 9
Sweeping generalities about developments in the rights of the
criminally accused lead inexorably to misunderstanding or confu-
sion regarding the specific application of doctrine to given cases.
Surely Swindler had no intention of confounding his reader; but
if The Modern Interpretation is read as a hornbook rather than as
the guideline it is, that could be the result. Such a careful and
distinguished scholar as Swindler would never imagine that one
would read his seven pages on the sixth amendment rights of the
accused as a definitive and exhaustive analysis of the monumental
developments from Powell v. Alabama" in 1932 to the present.
If there is a flaw in this book, then, it is not Professor Swind-
ler's, but it results from the unsophisticated reading of the material
and a failure to appreciate the shading and tones of constitutional
development, the massive commentary thereon and the reality of
37. 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
38. Id. at 4890.
39. Id. at 4896.
40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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the dynamic process which seemingly overnight can alter the di-
rection of constitutional doctrine.
There are many strengths. One is that the book is well-written
-so well-written that a reader can speed through it in just a few
hours and come away from it refreshed and stimulated. In this
respect The Modem Interpretation is like all Swindler's writing:
clear, coherent, and clever without trying to impart the magisterial
sniffery which Corwin seemed to take such great joy in doing.
One would never find Swindler saying, for instance:
Finally, I wish to draw attention to the fact that I have not suc-
cumbed to the recent fad of speaking of Congress as "the Con-
gress." The original Constitution, to be sure, employs the latter
terminology, inherited from Confederation days, but no President
from Washington down ever did so prior to F.D.R.; nor any Chief
Justice prior to Chief Justice Warren .... 41
Swindler retains the journalist's knack for succinctness as
well as his skill for capturing the assignment, flavor and all, and
telling his story well. This assignment is particularly difficult when
there have been hosts of commentaries terse and verbose over
nearly two hundred years.
One frustration in many legal tomes is the absolutely atrocious
indexing. Swindler must have sensed that, for The Moderm In-
terpretation has a fine index, with just a few lapses, and these are
hardly glaring omissions. 42  Included is a reference to the pro-
posed equal rights amendment, which helps to make the book a
truly modern interpretation.
43
The book, to be sure, was never intended to be a major contri-
bution to legal literature, as were its predecessors in this trilogy.
For in The Old Legality and The New Legality Swindler had gone
all out to explore every facet of constitutional growth in that
period of immense development of the American economic, social
and political fabrics; expounding, explaining and criticizing what
had happened in the best traditions of superb scholarship and con-
cluding, as only a writer totally immersed in the subject could,
that
[t]he restlessness of minorities, ethnic and economic, domestic
and foreign; the outward expansion of human ambitions toward
the universe which space technology was opening; the impact on
world society of now near-instantaneous communication and in-
41. Coawix, supra note 14, at ix.
42. One wishes, for example, that Swindler had provided a bibliography
of textual materials cited. Perhaps it is out of a sense of modesty
that he did not, for he cited himself in the footnotes nearly 50 times.
43. SwInDL., supra note 17, at 260.
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credibly rapid transportation-and withal, the chronic state of cri-
sis arising from the challenges which these changes presented to
all orthodoxy-these were prospects of the seventies which would
be little affected by a change of Presidents or Chief Justices.
From Fuller to Taft, the Court majority had sought to perpetuate
a particular philosophy in a system of constitutional interpretation.
From Hughes to Warren--and now beyond-the Court had come
to accept the fact that constitutional interpretation was simply a
continuing search for rules which were both appropriate and rele-
vant in the fact of successive and continuing challenges.
44
The Modern Interpretation has none of the drama and little of
the depth of its two predecessors. But if it was designed to serve
as a constitutional road-map, pointing out only the landmarks,
bringing the traveler over a lengthening constitutional journey up
to date on new construction without pointing out every valley and
mound along the way, it has surely succeeded. It is neither case-
book, treatise nor hornbook. Rather, it is a compendium of lead-
ing decisions and explanatory notes and observations by a truly
outstanding scholar.
The Modern Interpretation fills a vacuum, for a student who
desires a ready reference as a companion to his study of constitu-
tional law, for the practitioner who only occasionally is confronted
by a knotty problem in constitutional law and, indeed, for the lay-
man whose understanding of the field has grown rusty by time
and disuse. Nevertheless the serious constitutional scholar will
want to read the entire trilogy, for its depth, its sensitivity to the
total governmental and political process in this century and, most
of all, to sample the brilliant writing style of a man who com-
bines a career as an incisive journalist with that of a careful con-
stitutional scholar. The Modern Interpretation is but the prover-
bial tip of the iceberg in William Swindler's prolific bibliography.
And like that iceberg's exposed surface, it is an important landmark
in identifying a vast body of knowledge undisclosed to the casual
observer.
44. SWINDLER, THE NEw LEGAIxTY 1932-1968, 353 (1970). Professor Paul
Kauper of the University of Michigan, reviewing the first two books
in the trilogy stated:
The story told by Professor Swindler is not new. What adds
novelty and special value to his treatment is that he puts
this development in the context of the total historical forcesof the periods in question, including the general political de-
velopment, the differences between the major political par-
ties, and the relationship of the Court to Congress and the
President. The treatment of the extra-judicial factors and
the fascinating new historical data uncovered by the author
impart a distinctive value to these books. Kauper, Book
Review, 12 Wiw_. & MARY L. REy. 703, 705 (1971).
